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Abstract: The abstract should summarize the content and conclusions of the paper in less 200 words 
(Typically  around  10  sentences).  It  should  not  contain  any  references  or  displayed 
equations. Typeset the abstract in 10 points, italic. Labour market in the NMS is extensive 
and expanding. Sound macroeconomic policies are essential to support a well-balanced 
economic expansion and the full realisation of current growth potential at the fact that 
long term unemployment remains one of the most persistent problem and social issue 
facing many economies. Labour market policy and social policy in the NMS are facing a 
challenge to regulate a rapidly evolving labour market in the context of the globalized 
economy.  The  NMS  are  seeking  more  stability  and  security  in  order  to  encourage 
employers  to  invest  more  in  human  capital  to  be  able  to  boost  productivity  and 
competitiveness. Countries need to promote more flexibility and adaptability for both – 
enterprises  and  workers,  and  to  better  balance  them  with  security.  The  share  of 
traditional forms of flexible employment, such as fixed term and part-time jobs and other 
possibilities, has remained fairly stable; there has been a rise in employment based on 
non-labour  contracts  or  work  performed  without  a  contract.  Flexicurity  system 
contributed to higher employment and also to higher mobility between unemployment and 
employment labour force in some European economies. Attitudes, values and tradition of 
certain economy are preconditions for successfullness of the flexicurity system. 
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1  Introduction 
Slovenia became a member of the EMU on January 1, 2007 and is the only new member state 
(hereinafter referred to as NMS), which adopted the euro. During the process of integration in the 
European  monetary  integrations,  NMS  will  have  to  gradually  give  up  a  part  of  their  own 
monetary sovereignty, and abandon it completely when entering the EMU. Entering the European 
monetary union requires that the loss of independent monetary policy is substituted by other 
economic policies. Asymmetric shocks represent a problem in the common European monetary 
union, where the monetary policy is unable to work. Taking into account the fact that fiscal policy 
does not always represent a suitable instrument for taking actions, asymmetrical shocks at certain 
market rigidity can be neutralised only with increased capital and work mobility and a more 
flexible labour market. 
 
Experience  of  Western  European  countries  related  to  the  labour  market  flexibility  point  to 
different strengths and weaknesses. During the period of favourable economic conditions, ageing 
of the population and ensuring high level of social security, during which academic and political 
circles believed that social economy cannot cope with structural changes and demands regarding 
increased labour market flexibility, increased interest among NMS for the model of flexicurity 
has been noticed.   
 There are two different approaches to flexicurity. The first approach includes flexibilisation of the 
whole  work  force  and  includes  the  majority  of  employees  with  typical  working  contracts. 
Flexibilisation can be implemented in two ways, either through new ways of organising work or 
through different, more diverse working time arrangements. At the same time, flexibilisation 
should be accompanied with some forms of employment security. In this respect, Denmark is a 
well-known  example.  It  combines  relaxed  employment  protection  with  a  high  level  of 
employment benefits for the unemployed and active labour market policies. In doing this, the 
security component is ensured by the Government and not by the employers. Worker protection 
and  not  job  protection  is  in  the  forefront.  Austria  also  focused  on  this  component,  when  it 
codified severance payments, which are transferable and not linked to one employer. 
 
The second approach includes the normalisation of the rights of employees with atypical working 
contracts  (part-time  employment,  different  forms  of  temporary  employment,  and  fixed-term 
employment),  without  reducing  the  flexibility  of  such  contracts.  The  same  idea  will  be 
implemented in the Netherlands through increased social security of the employees with atypical 
employment contracts and through the unification of their rights with those of full-time workers. 
Trade unions in Slovenia are also in favour of equal rights for workers on part-time employment 
contracts and those on full-time contracts (taking loans, education, pension rights, etc.).  
 
There are huge differences regarding the proportion of atypical workers among the EU-15 states. 
In some countries have very high shares. Both the United Kingdom and the Netherlands have 
high percentage of part-time work, whereas Spain has a high percentage of fixed-term contracts. 
30%  of  the  entire  workforce  in  Spain  represents  employees  on  fixed-term  contracts.  Recent 
labour market reforms in Spain have attempted to redress some of the disadvantages associated 
with previous reforms, which aimed at the flexibilisation of the labour market. Excessive labour 
market segmentation and declining levels of per head productivity presented a huge problem. The 
purpose of recent reforms was to increase security and rights of workers with atypical workers 
and to create incentives for employers to convert atypical to typical contracts. 
 
In our contribution, we try to answer the question if efficient combination of flexible labour 
market and employment security is possible in NMS and to explain the notion of flexicurity. 
 
2  Labour market flexicurity in some EU-15 states 
During the time of favourable economic conditions and high level of social security, during which 
academic and political circles believed that social economy cannot cope with structural changes 
and demands regarding increased labour market flexibility, increased interest among the majority 
of European countries for the Danish model of flexicurity has been noticed.  
 
In Denmark, the balance between employment flexibility and social security is maintained by 
social  policy,  unemployment  benefits,  loose  collective  agreements,  a  lower  degree  of 
centralisation and with the decentralised negotiations between social partners, as well as with the 
help from internal labour market and setting up of small enterprises. Similarly, high level of 
social security is also a characteristic of the Swedish labour market, whereas the flexibility of 
Swedish labour market is considerably lower. This is mainly the consequence of low trust among 
social partners, but the situation in this area has improved considerably. Denmark belongs to 
countries with the lowest job security, which is nevertheless higher than in Switzerland, Canada, 
Great Britain and the United States.  
 
In the Netherlands, the emphasis is on employment security and not job security. In this respect, 
negotiations between social partners and part-time employment play an important role. Belgium  
and Germany have high flexibility in their internal labour markets, whereas Denmark and the 
Netherlands  have  high  flexibility  in  their  external  labour  markets.  Unlike  the  Netherlands, 
Germany and Belgium have more traditional forms of flexibility, emphasising internal numerical 
flexibility and job security (see Table 1).   
 
Belgium, Luxemburg and Portugal developed a system, which ensures high employment security. 
The same holds true for Spain and Ireland, where employment security is slightly lower. In Spain, 
security and flexibility are differentiated with regard to different groups of employees, which is a 
consequence of a dual labour market. On one labour market employees are highly protected, 
whereas on the other they are much less protected, which leads to a higher flexibility of this 
labour market. In the United Kingdom the model of liberal labour market prevails, which enables 
easier and quicker promotion and thus leads to greater employment security. In Great Britain, 
Portugal and Luxemburg the time to convert atypical employment to typical is the shortest.  
 
Table 1: EU states with regard to predominant flexicurity type 
  Job security  Employment 
security  Income security  Combination 
security 
External numerical 
flexibility  Spain  The Netherlands, 






Spain  Austria  Finland 
Functional flexibility  Germany, 
Portugal  Italy, Latvia  Germany  Denmark 
Labour cost/wage 
flexibility  Portugal, Austria    Austria   
Externalisational 
flexibility         
Source: [1] and [2]. 
 
There  are  different  forms  of  labour  market  flexibility:  (i)  external  numerical  flexibility,  (ii) 
internal numerical flexibility, (iii) functional flexibility, (iv) labour cost/wage flexibility and (v) 
externalisational  flexibility.  With  regard  to  security  we  differ  between:  (i)  job  security,  (ii) 
employment security, (iii) income security and (iv) combination security (see Table 2). 
 Table 2: Flexicurity matrix 
Varnost/fleksibilnost  Job security (protection 
against lay-offs and 
considerable changes 
regarding working conditions) 
Employment security 
(availability of suitable jobs) 
Income security (ensured 
minimal benefits when  
unemployed) 
Combination security (a 
combination of afore-
mentioned formsa of security) 
External  numerical 
flexibility  (flexibility 
regarding  employment 
and laying-off) 
- Types of employment 
contracts 
- Employment protection 
legislation 
- Early retirement 
- Employment services 
/active labour market 
policy 
- training/life-long learning 
- unemployment 
compensations 
- other social benefits 
- minimum wages 
 
- protection against 
dismissal during various 
leave schemes 
 
Internal  numerical 
flexibility  (flexibility 
regarding working hours) 
- shortened work/week 
/part-time employment 
- employment protection 
legislation 
- training/life-long learning 
- part-time supplementary 
benefit 
- study grants 
- sickness benefits (e.g. due 
to sickness or injuries) 
- different kind of leave 
schemes 
- part-time pension 
Functional flexibility (job 
rotations  with  regard  to 




- labour leasing 
- subcontracting 
- »outsourcing« 
- training/life-long learning 
- job rotation 
- teamwork 
- performance related pay 
systems 
- voluntary working time 
arrangements 
 
Labour  cost/  wage 
flexibility  (adjustments 
regarding  wages 
according to performance 
of  employees  and 
companies) 
- local adjustment in labour 
cost 
- scaling/reductions in social 
security payments 
- changes in social security 
payments 
- employment subsidies  
- in-work benefits 
- collective wage 
agreements 
- benefit for shortened work 
week 




flexibility  (employment 
without  employment 
contracts,  through 
employment agencies) 
       
Source: [3] and author′s amendments.  
3  Flexicurity in NMS-12 
After 1990, NMS-12 were faced with the decrease of the number of employed and increased long-term 
unemployment. Employment trends moved from large state-owned companies to small and medium-sized 
private enterprises and from primary and secondary to tertiary and quarter sectors. 
 
In their  efforts to adapt  their labour  markets,  Slovenia and the Check  Republic  were among the  most 
successful NMS countries (and also Slovakia). They succeeded in lowering the unemployment rate to one 
digit level, and at the same time retain high level of work activity. The reason for this is likely to lie in more 
favourable economic structure and efficient labour market policy. 
 
Due to less favourable economic structure labour market adaptation in Poland lasted for a longer period of 
time than in other NMS. The reason for this lies in ineffective labour market policy. Kluwe, Lehmann and 
Schmidt [4] found out that the long-term labour market policy was efficient enough, but the efficiency of 
various employment programmes aimed at the improvement of professional worker mobility was hindered 
by  market  inconsistencies.  Boeri  and  Flinn  [5]  for  example,  found  out  that  low  level  of  employing 
unemployed persons was the consequence of segregation of those who had been once employed in the 
public sector, because it was difficult for them to get employment in the private sector. An important reason 
for a slower labour market adaptation can also be found in too low percentage of gross domestic product for 
financing active labour market policy. Poland had, similarly as Slovenia, introduced the programme of 
public works, with the purpose to improve full-time employment opportunities for the unemployed. The 
Slovene programme differed from the Polish programme in that it ensured jobs in education and culture 
also for more educated unemployed workers. 
 
Among the NMS, Poland has highest degree of unemployment and second lowest degree of work activity. 
Only Hungary has a lower degree of work activity. Low professional and spatial mobility of workers can 
partly be explained by the increase in the number of unemployed workers and agricultural subsidies. 
 
The Check Republic implemented both active and passive labour market policy. Its active labour market 
policy  was  carried  out  in  local  employment  offices.  Within  the  framework  of  this  policy,  it  also 
implemented  programmes  for  the  employment  of  disabled  and  graduates.  Its  passive  policy  was 
implemented through unemployment benefits. The unemployed were receiving such compensation for the 
maximum period of six months, and amounted to 60 % of their last net wage, and not exceeding 150% of 
minimal wage. In addition to programmes of active labour market policy, the Check Republic effectively 
implemented programmes of passive policy, because they did not have a negative influence on the duration 
of unemployment. 
 
Because spending for active labour market policy in NMS-12 is very low, they lag behind the Danish model 
of flexible security considerably. On the other hand, there are analyses that confirm the efficiency of some 
programmes (Ederveen and Thiessen 2004). Among NMS-6, Slovenia had the highest percentage of GDP 
expenditure for active labour market policy in 1998 (0.83), and was followed by Slovakia (0.32), Poland 
(0.30), Hungary (0.30), Estonia (0.07) and the Czech Republic (0.05). The highest percentage for GDP 
expenditure for active labour market policy per percentage of unemployment among NMS-6 in 1998 had 
Slovenia (0.11), Hungary (0,036), Poland (0.028) and Slovakia (0.026), the lowest the Czech Republic and 
Estonia (0.007). Despite the fact that Slovenia had the highest percentage among NMS-6, it was still below 
the EU average (0.16), and lagged considerably behind the Netherlands (0.55) and Denmark (0.34), which 
belong to OECD countries with the highest percentage of GDP expenditure aimed at active labour market 
policy per percentage of unemployment. The OECD average in 1998 was 0.14.  
 
Between  1996 and  2004,  the  expenditure  from  GDP  in  NMS-7  regarding  active  labour  market  policy 
decreased considerably. The Czech Republic and Lithuania were the only exception. Despite the fact that 
all NMS implemented different programmes of active labour market policy, the expenditure remained low. 
At the same time, their growth lagged behind the growth in GDP, which remained considerably high all the time. Despite high level of unemployment in Poland and Slovakia, they also recorded, as all other NMS, 
decreased expenditure for active labour market policy (see Table 3).
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Table 3: Expenditure for active labour market policy [% of GDP], 
(in brackets: normalised to the unemployment level) 
  EU-14  NMS-
7
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Note: (-) data not available. Source: [6] and own calculations. 
 
In addition to expenditure for active labour market policy, expenditure for passive policy also decreased 
during the period between 1998 and 2004 in NMS-7. The only exception being the Czech Republic, Estonia 
and Poland. Among NMS-7, the highest percentage for passive labour market policy expenditure in 1998 
had Hungary (0.91) and Slovenia (0.89), and the lowest in Estonia (0.10), Latvia (0.22) and the Czech 
Republic (0.27).  All NMS-7 had a lower percentage than the EU-15 average (see Table 4).  
 
The  highest  percentage  of  expenditure  from  GDP  for  passive  labour  market  policy  per  percentage  of 
unemployment level can be found in 1998 in NMS-7 in Slovenia (0.11), Poland (0.058) and Slovakia 
(0.044), the lowest in Estonia (0.01) and Lithuania (0.017). NMS-7 average amounted to 0.05, in 2004 to 
0.03. 
 
Table 4: Expenditure for passive labour market policy [% of GDP], 
(in brackets: normalised to the unemployment level) 
  EU-15  NMS-
7 
CZ  EE  HU  LV  LT  PL  SK  SI 








































Note: (-) data not available. Source: [7] and own calculations. 
 
Before entering the EU, NMS established the majority of labour market institutions, which exist in EU-15. 
By doing so, they wanted to increase labour market flexibility and improve adjustment capability of the 
economy. The majority of states introduced the system of social security in cases of unemployment, which 
included unemployment benefits. Initially, unemployment benefits were rather high, and had to be lowered 
later. The reason for this lies in the development of rent seekers and in increased pressure on public finance.  
 
The level of unemployment benefits range in the EU-15 between 50-70 % and are considerably higher than 
in NMS. The unemployed receive benefits for 6 to 12 months. The amount of unemployment benefits 
decreased in Lithuania, Hungary, Poland and in Slovakia and remained more or less the same in Lithuania 
and the Czech Republic. The only exception is Estonia, which increased the amount of unemployment 








                                                            
1 NMS experiences proved that DFI (direct foreign investment) is extremely important fro the creation of new jobs. 
Thus, the promotion of DFI can be considered as a measure of active labour market policy.  
 
2 The correlation between the amount of unemployment benefit and employment security is negative.  
Table 5: The amount of unemployment benefits (2003) 
  EU  NMS-
8 
CZ  HU  PL  SK  SL  EE  LV  LT 
First month  63  50  50  64  40  60  63  50  50  25 
60th month  37  16  31  24  30  42  0  0  0  0 
 
In NMS unemployment benefits are received for a shorter period than in the EMU. Despite higher level of 
long-term  unemployment,  unemployment  benefits  are  less  progressive  in  CEE  states  than  in  EMU 
countries. The amount of unemployment benefits ranges between 67 and 130 % of average wage.  
 
In the period of transition, minimum wage in NMS was rather low, and was only partly adapted to price 
growth level, and if so usually wit a considerable delay. Not so long ago, minimum wage was adapted to 
the growth of cost of living. In NMS, the value of Kaitz index (which represents the relationship between 
minimum and average salary) is around 30, which is considerably below the EU average (50). The average 
minimum wage in NMS amounts to one fifth of the average wage in the EMU. Only in Slovenia the 
average wage can be comparable to the average wages of countries at the bottom of the EMU scale. Among 
NMS-8, Slovenia had the highest minimum wage in the second part of 2006 (511,6€), whereas the lowest 
minimum wage had Latvia (129.3€) (see Table 6). 
 
Table 6: Minimum wage (2006, 2nd half of the year) 
  NMS-8  CZ  HU  PL  SK  SL  EE  LV  LT 
€/month  240.1  280.2  229.5  223.3  181.3  511.6  191.7  129.3  173.8 
 
In  NMS,  the  limitations  regarding  the  salaries  in  private  sector  are  not  binding.  The  percentage  of 
employees, who are trade union members, is in NMS comparable with the EMU average, whereas the 
percentage of employees, who are involved in collective bargaining, is not comparable. In NMS, the role of 
trade unions is weaker than in the EMU and in the EU-15. The percentage of employees, who are trade 
union members, amounts to 23 % in NMS-8, and to 43 % in EU-15. The percentage of employees, who are 
involved  in  collective  bargaining,  is  37  %  in  NMS-9,  and  72  %  in  the  EU-14.  In  NMS,  collective 
bargaining is carried out mainly on entrepreneurial level, whereas in the EU-15 they are carried out in the 
sectoral level. Slovakia and Slovenia are the only exception. The percentage of employees, who are trade 
union members, has decreased considerably lately (see Table 7). The highest decrease is seen in Baltic 
countries, Poland, Slovakia, and slightly less in the EU-15. The reason for such decrease is the decrease of 
the share of processing services and an increase in the share of services, which are less unified.
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% of paid 
workers, who 









3,5  43/30  36/14  60/20  30/15  40/15  34/15  62/35  60/41 
% of paid 
workers, who 




  25-30  28  31  <20  10-15  40  48  100 
Notes: 
1Unweighted EU-13 average. 
2Unweighted NMS-8 average. 
3Weighted average for 2002. 
4Data for EU-14. 




                                                            
3 Privatisation of state companies, higher level of unemployment and increased number of small and medium-sized 
enterprises are key reasons for the decrease of unification in iondividual sectors. 
 Employment security index (index EPL) 
 
During the previous socio-economic system employment security was extremely high in the majority of 
NMS-12. The basic feature of labour markets was high employment growth. During the 70s of the previous 
century the employment growth level in Slovenia increased by 3.8%, which was the consequence of the 
then  socio-economic  system,  which  allowed  for  permanent  retention  of  jobs.  After  1973,  when  the 
opportunities  to  get  employment  abroad decreased  and  when,  after  1980,  economic  growth  in  the  ex-
Yugoslavia  begun  to  stagnate,  the  autonomous  employment  growth  caused  the  growth  of  disguised 
unemployment. Due to the economic crisis the annual employment growth level decreased to 0.3%. After 
1987,  registered unemployment also  started  to increase.  Because of economic restructuring  and higher 
efficiency in the distribution of production factors, employment security decreased in the majority of NMS-
12 after 1990.  
 
In the majority of NMS EPL index has decreased form the 90s of the previous century to 2004. In 2003, the 
Czech Republic and Hungary had the lowest EPL index among the NMS-12, which have the most flexible 
working  legislation.  They  were  followed  by  Slovakia,  Poland  and  Lithuania,  and  Latvia,  Estonia  and 
Slovenia, which have similar EPL index as the EU-14 states. Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania and Romania 
have strict employment legislation, especially in the area of collective redundancies (see Table 8). Baltic 
states have a higher EPL index and lower amounts of unemployment benefits, whereas Central European 
states have a more flexible legislation and higher amounts of unemployment benefits.  
 
Table 8: EPL index
1 za NMS-9 [1-6] (end of 90s of 20th cent./2002/2003/2004) 
EPL index components    Index EPL  






Bulgaria  2,8/2,5/-/2,0  2,3/1,9/-/2,1  3,4/3,4/-/0,9  2,9/1,8/-/4,1 
The  Czech 
Republic 
2,2/2,1/1,9/2,0  3,0/2,8/3,3/3,3  0,5/0,5/0,5/0,5  3,2/4,3/2,1/2,6 
Estonia  2,4/2,6/2,6/2,3  2,9/3,1/3,1/2,7  1,7/1,4/1,4/1,3  2,9/4,1/4,5/4,0 
Lithuania  -/-/2,7/2,8  -/-/3,0/2,9  -/-/1,4/2,4  -/-/4,9/3,6 
Hungary  1,8/1,7/1,7/1,6  2,1/2,1/1,9/2,2  1,2/0,6/1,1/0,4  2,5/3,4/2,9/3,4 
Poland  2,0/2,0/2,1/2,2  2,3/2,2/2,2/2,0  1,4/1,0/1,3/2,0  2,7/3,9/4,1/3,5 
Romania  -/-/-/2,8  -/-/-/1,7  -/-/-/3,0  -/-/-/4,8 
Slovakia  2,3/2,4/2,0/1,7  2,6/2,6/3,5/2,7  2,0/1,4/0,4/0,3  2,4/4,4/2,5/3,0 
Slovenia  3,3/3,5/2,3/2,6  3,4/3,4/2,9/2,7  2,7/2,4/0,6/2,3  4,5/4,8/4,9/3,3 
NMS-9 average  -/2,5/-/-  -/2,5/-/-  -/1,7/-/-  -/3,9/-/- 
EU average  2,4/2,4/-/-  2,4/2,4/-/-  -/2,1/-/-  -/3,2/-/- 
Note: 
1Employment Protection Legislation Index. EPL index is calculated as weighted average of 22 indicators, which 
are regarding to procedures, expenses, limitations and conditions regarding the termination of employment contract. 
The value of EPL index can be 1-6: countries with the most flexible legislation have index close to 1, countries with 
the least flexible legislation have index close 6. (-) data not available. Source: [9], [10] and [11]. 
 
With regard to security indicators of part-time employment, convergence was noticed among the EU-14 
states in  the  period between 1990  and  2003.  In  Southern European  countries,  the  flexibility of labour 
legislation increased, whereas in Anglo-Saxon it decreased. This is also one of the reasons why the Czech 
Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia are getting closer to Great Britain and Ireland with regard to part-time 
employment  security  indicators.  In  2003,  Slovakia  liberalised  labour  legislation  regarding  collective 
redundancies and full-time employment. The most important reforms in the labour market were carried out 
in Slovenia, which had an influence on the lowering of EPL index in 2003. Slovenia does not lag behind the 
Western  European  countries  with  regard  to  flexible  employment  practices.  Among  all  newly  signed 
contracts 70 % were part-time contracts. Despite reforms Slovenia still has the most restrictive labour 







In the Czech Republic and Bulgaria an employer does not need to give a valid reason in order to give 
notice.  On  the  other  hand,  it  is  obligatory  in  Slovenia  to  give  a  valid  reason  for  the  termination  of 
employment.  Slovenian  legislation  states  the  following  among  valid  reasons  for  the  termination  of 
employment: business reason, the reason of incapacity and fault reason. The Act also states unfounded 
reasons for the termination of an employment contract: temporary absence from work due to disease or 
injury or due to parental leave, trade union membership and participation in trade union activities (including 
participation in a strike). Exercising workers' rights against an employer is also stated in the Act. Before the 
employment termination, the employer has to carry out certain procedural obligations – the employer must 
in writing call the worker's attention to the possibility of employment termination. The employer must 
provide the worker an opportunity to defend himself (this is also the case in Hungary). If thus requested by 
the worker, the employer must inform in writing the trade union. The trade union may give its opinion 
within eight days. If the trade union opposes the termination, the termination of the contract is not effective 
until the expiration of the term for arbitration and/or judicial protection. Because the termination of contract 
is not effective, the worker remains employed until the process is concluded. This is an extremely important 
protection. In Estonia, the employer also has to inform trade unions about the employment termination, 
whereas in Ukraine, the employer only has to do so in cases when the worker has not been offered another 
job or in cases when a worker does not want to accept the offered job.  
 
Trade Unions also have an important role in Croatia, the Czech Republic and in Lithuania, as well as in 
Slovakia, where employers have to negotiate the employment termination with the Trade Union (which is 
similar to the situation in Poland). 
 
The amount of unemployment benefit depends on the reason for the employment termination in Bulgaria, 
Estonia, the Czech Republic and in Slovakia. In Slovenia, the amount depends on years of service, if the 
employment  termination  is  due  to  business  reasons  (because  of  economic,  technological,  structural, 
organisational and other reasons).  
 
In some NMS-12 states (e.g. in the Czech Republic and in Lithuania) age, years of service, the number of 
dependents, etc have to be considered before the employment termination. In Hungary, Poland and Bulgaria 
employers have to offer another job before the employment termination. In Estonia, workers are treated 
preferentially with regard to their trade union activities and skills, whereas in some NMS countries social 
components are taken into account. 
 
In the case of unfounded reasons for employment termination the employer is obliged to pay the worker the 
compensation for any loss of income and penal provisions. This does not hold true for Croatia, Estonia and 
Slovenia. Slovenian legislation does not directly determine the amount of compensation for the loss of 
income  and  penal  provisions,  whereas  in  Estonia  and  Bulgaria  the  legislation  determines  that  the 
compensation for the loss of income should amount to six last average salaries. In Croatia the amount of 
compensation depends on the duration of the last signed employment contract and on the age of the worker. 
Frequently, the amount of compensation for loss of income also depends on the employer who may or may 




Part-time  employment  depends  on  objective  circumstances,  among  which  the  following  should  be 
mentioned: temporary increased amount of work, seasonal work, project work, employment of a foreigner, 
employment of a manager, etc.
4 In Hungary, Slovakia and Poland there are no limitations regarding the 
reasons for concluding part-time employment contracts. On the other hand, the conclusion of employment 
contract outside objective reasons differs among the states considerably due to different legislation. Croatia 
and  Ukraine  have  limited  the  use  of  part-time  contracts  to  objective,  whereas  Slovenia,  Estonia  and 
                                                            
4 Objective circumstances are defined differently in different countries. Lithuania  also  state  certain  special  circumstances.  Slovenian  legislation  states,  for  instance,  that  the 
conclusion of part-time employment contracts is possible for jobs that are temporary in their nature.   
 
In Bulgaria, part-time employment contracts can be concluded for the period not longer than three years, 
and cannot, in some cases, be prolonged. There are also limitations regarding minimum duration. Such 
system was also introduced in 2004 by Lithuania, Estonia and Poland, whereas Hungary, Croatia and the 
Czech  Republic  introduced  limitations  regarding  contract  chaining  and  the  total  duration  of  such 
employment. Due to the problem of contract chaining in Slovenia, the duration of such employment was 
limited to the maximum of two years. It is not allowed, according to the legislation, to sign one or more 
part-time employment contracts with the same worker and for the same work for more than two years (for 
three years during the transitional period). After this period of time, a full-time employment contract should 
be signed. If the fixed-term employment contract has been concluded contrary to law or if the worker 
continues to work even after the period for which he had concluded the employment contract, it shall be 
assumed that the worker had concluded an employment contract for an indefinite period of time (see Table 
9).  
 
Table 9: Percentage of part-time employees (2005), NMS-12 
  EU-27  CZ  EE  CY  LV  LT  HU  MT  PL  SI  SK  BG  RO 
1995  11.7  6.7  2.1  -  -  -  6.6  -  11.6  -  -  -  - 
2000  12.6  8.1  3.0  10.7  6.7  4.4  7.1  4.1  19.9  13.7  4.8  6.3  2.8 
2005  14.5  8.6  2.7  14.0  8.4  5.5  7.0  4.5  19.5  17.4  5.0  6.4  2.4 
Note: (-) data not available. 
 
Slovenian legislation also determines part-time employment through Employment Services. Such part-time 
employment contracts are of temporary nature and can only last up to one year (the same situation is in 
Croatia and the Czech Republic, whereas Hungary and Slovakia do not limit the duration of such contracts). 
During the time, when the worker is employed, he receives a full payment, whereas during the time, when 
the worker does not work, the wage cannot be lower than 70% of minimum wage, the risk is being carried 
by the Employment Service. In some cases, the legislation does not allow such employment practices: in 
cases when workers employed with the user are on strike, in cases when the user has during the period of 
the past 12 months terminated employment contracts to a large number of workers employed (full-time) 
with him and in cases of workplaces that shows that workers are exposed to dangers and risks. In Poland, 
this employment practice can be used only within objective circumstances.  
 
In Bulgaria, the employer can sign a part-time contract with the worker only in cases stipulated in the law, 
whereas Estonia and Poland do not stipulate any limitations. In the Czech Republic, the employer is not 
allowed to sign a part-time contract with the candidate, who completed the probation, secondary school or a 
faculty period less than two years ago, and who acquired suitable qualifications for certain jobs, except if 
the candidate is willing to sign such a contract. 
 
In Hungary, the conditions for chaining part-time contracts have become stricter lately. The same has also 
been  done  in  Poland,  which,  at  the  same  time,  introduced  very  strict  legislation  regarding  part-time 
employment through Employment Services. In Bulgaria, Estonia and in the Czech Republic, chaining of 
part-time  employment  contracts  is  not  limited  in  any  way.  This  is  not  the  case  in  Poland,  where  the 
employer and worker can only sign a part-time contract twice, whereas the third contract automatically 
becomes  a  full-time  employment  contract.  In  the  Czech  Republic,  Poland  and  in  Estonia,  the  labour 
legislation does not limit the cumulative length of part-time employment, which, on the other hand, is not 
the case in Bulgaria. 
 
In  Bulgaria,  Estonia,  the  Czech  Republic  and  in  Poland  labour  legislation  does  not  govern  part-time 
employment through Employment Services. 






Laying off of workers is considered collective redundancies if an employer makes workers redundant in the 
following way: within the period of 30 days at least 10 workers with the employer employing more than 20 
and less than 100 workers are made redundant, at least 10% of workers (with the employer employing at 
least 100 workers, and less than 300 workers) or at least 30 workers with the employer employing 300 or 
more  workers. This  definition  differs from one  state to another (say  in  the Czech  Republic,  Hungary, 
Poland, Estonia and Latvia). In Bulgaria, collective redundancies is mentioned in the Employment Act, but 
not  precisely  defined.  In  Estonia  and  Poland,  there  is  no  legal  act,  which  would  regulate  collective 
redundancies. 
 
4  Conclusion 
The  choice  of  a  particular  form  of  flexicurity  depends  primarily  on  historical  development  of  labour 
markets, collective agreements and the role of government in these, as well as on basic considerations of 
social and labour policy.  
 
Labour market flexibility ensures labour cost adjustments and the reduction of the number of unemployed 
workers. This has been proved by the experiences of countries with a high labour market flexibility and low 
employment security. On the other hand, countries with high employment security and poor labour market 
flexibility have a higher level of unemployment. Labour market flexibility has an important impact on the 
supply of workforce, because the workforce can, under the active labour market policy, education and 
training adapt to the market demand. The latter can also represent a reduction in social security entitlements 
for the employees. Therefore, it is necessary to choose such a combination of economic policy measures in 
the NMS-12 that will increase labour market flexibility on one side and retain a high level of social security 
on the other side.  
 
Experiences of some NMS show that it is necessary to judge the appropriateness of individual forms of 
labour market flexibility and security both from the point of view of competitiveness of the economy as a 
whole and social security of employees. The system of flexicurity requires a certain degree of »maturity« of 
the society and social partners, trust during negotiations and a certain negotiation culture, needed for the 
harmonisation of different interests among the participants (employers, employees, government). Values, 
ethics,  competences  and  the  attitude  of  workers  towards  success  should  also  be  taken  into  account. 
Imposing different forms of flexicurity on the environment with rigid labour market and poorly developed 
labour legislation can lead to unfavourable effects, threaten social security of employees, lead to abuse of 
the system, increase expenses for active and passive labour market policy and question the soundness of the 
reforms. 
 
An  important question is also  to  what  extent  the  success  of  different  forms  of  flexicurity  depends  on 
economic conditions and labour market characteristics. The advantages of individual forms are, above all, 
shown during the period of lower economic growth, when employees become increasingly resistant to more 
flexible forms of employment, and when the demand for more security is on the increase. Experiences of 
Western  European  countries  proved  that  favourable  trends  on  the  labour  market  during  favourable 
economic conditions are mainly due to favourable economic trends and not more flexible employment 
practices. This, of course, did not bring to light all disadvantages of individual types of flexicurity.  
 
High administrative expenses should also be mentioned among the disadvantages of flexicurity (expenses 
related to employment brokerage, ensuring unemployment benefits, etc.), which may appear in the case of 
low  efficiency  of  the  public  sector.  Therefore  it  is  necessary  to  determine  the  expenses  and  benefits 
stemming from the introduction of different types of flexicurity. With frequent job changes the question 
may be raised about the motivation of the employers to finance education and training of employees with 
atypical employment contracts and what level of uncertainty is acceptable for the employees. 
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